B.C. Electronic Voting Machine Survey Results Are In!

Beginning back in early June, with the help of a list originally supplied by blackboxvoting.org and then supplemented with one from a survey on civicinfo.bc.ca, I contacted, by email, 53 B. C. municipalities which the lists indicated were using electronic voting machines in their local elections (Council, School Board and referendum). These municipalities ranged in population from 1,655 to 579,412 (normally 2006 census - civicinfo.bc.ca).

In order to better understand their use of the machines and essential testing and security protocols, I asked each of them the following 7 questions:

1. do you use electronic voting machines for local government elections/referendum? If not, please tell me and thank you for having taken the time to read this email
2. if so, what would you say is your main reason for using them?
3. what makes(s) and model(s) of machines do you currently use? Plan to use in November 2008?
4. how long have you been using these machines?
5. what is the number of the bylaw authorizing the use of these electronic voting machines and specifying the procedures for voting and counting the votes and how can I obtain a copy of same?
6. how many machines are in use at one time and are they connected via a 'live' network to a central tabulating computer during the election?
7. how do you handle training and technical support for these machines, both in between and during the actual election/referendum? This could include items such as maintenance, repair, programming and security. How many spare machines do you have?

Interestingly enough, even after at least one 'friendly' reminder, only 36 (68%) of the 53 municipalities took the time to respond. Officials with Central Saanich and Lake Country responded in a manner but did not answer more than 1 of the questions. Those that, for reasons not shared with me, wouldn't take the 10-15 minutes to complete the survey questions, were: Chetwynd, Coquitlam, Courtenay, Hope, Kelowna, Nanaimo, North Saanich, Osoyoos, Pitt Meadows, Powell River, Qualicum Beach, Salmon Arm, Sooke, Spallumcheen, Squamish, Summerland and Vanderhoof. The widely reported insecurity of the machines aside, I think the voters in these municipalities should be very concerned that they are not only using electronic voting machines which are known to be easily compromised, but those responsible don't even care to discuss it!! That, in itself, should raise a huge, red flag flag' and could be interpreted as the staff not being fully confident in their use of the machines (if they are not prepared to be queried on it).

The results from those that did complete their survey generally show that the main reasons for using the machines are "accuracy" and "speed" (i.e. convenience) and reducing voter disenfranchisement (automatic checking of the ballot for 'overvotes' and 'undervotes'), that there are very few that have any machine-related security measures built into their electronic voting authorization bylaws and they generally seem unaware of the risks, NONE of them reported doing a random audit of the results during the election, some of them have the vendor or another third party involved in the programming of the machines, a few of them share their machines with another out-of-province jurisdiction and ALL of them use the machines to perform a recount, if necessary, i.e., there is no hand-counting of ballots. These would be some of the classic signs of an insecure installation and a 'problem waiting to happen'! On a slightly positive note, none of those that use more than a single machine connect them to a 'live' network, which reduces the possibility of a virus being introduced but doesn't entirely eliminate it.

These responses basically failed to convince me that they understood the nature of the physical and 'virtual' security issues involved in the use of these machines, e.g., no one appears to require two persons to be present when the machines/memory cards are programmed, tested and secured as well as two keys to access the machines and the programmable memory cards. They are also confusing the term "accuracy" with that of "repeatability" - the machines are very good at producing the same result over and over again (repeatability) when given the same inputs but that DOES NOT mean that they are properly reflecting the voter's intent (accuracy). While the aspect of voter disenfranchisement due to undetected overvotes/undervotes is not to be downplayed, the extent of voter disenfranchisement due to compromised machines are likely to be far greater.

I am not holding myself out as an expert on this complex issue but, based on extensive reading and having more than average knowledge of computer technology, I believe the experts. Let's pay careful attention to what wide-spread use of these machines (reportedly at about 33%) in the U.S elections in November (even though several states have 'de-certified' them due to a number of concerns, they have been forced to use them because they have nothing else that will be ready in time) produces.